SPOOK REVUE

A Russian Spy-Net: Deception & Disinformation

“Billionaire GB News backer awarded £6m in ‘Russian spy’ defamation case” (The Telegraph)

Christopher Chandler secures damages in long-running dispute that involved several MPs.

The hidden meaning behind this news headline is that William Lofgren, a former senior official with the Central Intelligence Agency, defrauded clients in the private-sector (after retiring from the Agency) with bogus “intelligence.”

And this nagging question: Did Lofgren do this merely to enrich himself with the hundreds of thousands of dollars he dishonestly received for “intelligence reporting”—or was he willfully planting disinformation on behalf of the Russian intelligence services?

Two weeks ago at a federal courthouse in Washington, D.C. I testified in defense of Donald Berlin, who I believe was unfairly targeted regarding misinformation or disinformation that originated from Bill Lofgren and the renegade Russian spy ring he purported to represent.

Lofgren served in the CIA for 30-plus years and rose to division chief of the Eurasia Desk (a.k.a. Russia House).

When he retired from that agency, in 1996, Lofgren apparently took with him into the private sector a Russian intelligence asset who, he claimed to prospective clients, had an open window into secret SVR archives in Moscow.

One of the more curious episodes during my tenure as Prince Albert’s spymaster in Monaco (2002-07) was a brief association with Lofgren’s spy-net, controlled by a Russian facilitator who (we deduced) had much earlier defected to the USA after many years operating as a double agent for the CIA.

Lofgren told us that his facilitator ran a network of Russian intelligence officers still working in Moscow who could gain access to the main intelligence archival registry and view files upon request. These agents could not photocopy any paperwork, we were made to understand, but were permitted to enter a secure facility and take detailed notes, which were then smuggled out of Russia and typed up as a report, often delivered by Lofgren himself.

I had first gotten to know Lofgren when he assisted former CIA spymaster Clair George and me in the private-sector. We utilized Lofgren’s spy-net for one of our clients.

Additionally, a couple of years before Prince Albert retained me to be his full-time intelligence adviser (June 2002), we tested Lofgren’s spy-net after the prince expressed concern about a Russian resident of Monaco whose proposal his government was considering for investment into the principality’s football club, ASM. 

The report we received (for a hefty fee) was highly detailed, impressive and rang true with what we had already garnered through other sources.

Lofgren took great care to eliminate any data from his reports that might have identified his network on the basis that his facilitator’s on-site agents in Moscow were running a huge risk by peddling Russian secrets, the penalty for which, if caught, would be execution. 

Thus, Lofgren was adamant that his spy-net had to be so strictly protected that if we insisted on knowing more about the veracity of the “intelligence” we received (and we did) or if we revealed to anyone other than our client the findings of his spy-net he would (Lofgren was very clear on this point) no longer do business with us.

In other words, he created the perfect shield for assuring he wouldn’t get caught out.

Because of Lofgren’s credentials—and because Clair George knew Bill and vouched for him—we were willing to accept his findings at face value without much scrutiny.

In hindsight, this was a mistake.

First off, Lofgren was clearly violating Agency rules by creating a commercial relationship with a Russian CIA asset. He should have known better. He did know better. But Bill chose to break the rules. Maybe he left the Agency with bitterness. Or perhaps his character was flawed. It should have raised a red flag.

The problem with operating independently and without a support system (such as the CIA) is that raw intelligence would not go through the arduous process of vetting needed for validation.

Soon after utilizing Lofgren’s spy-net for Monaco Intelligence, I began to suspect that those involved, starting with Lofgren himself, were taking advantage of the trust (and much money) provided them. Instead of raiding SVR files (if such a methodology ever truly existed), it was beginning to look as though they were mixing open-source material with fabricated “intelligence.”  And not only that. They also appeared to be selling files paid for by us, supposedly on an “exclusive” basis, to third parties.

Lofgren, as front man, vehemently rebuffed any doubt or criticism about his spy-net’s reporting. But for us the jig was up and we moved on to what we considered to be more reliable sources, i.e. intelligence services including the CIA and Britain’s MI6, with which we forged liaison relationships.

New evidence since then even more strongly suggests that insatiable greed and laziness—or perhaps something much worse—had been taking place.

Something’s Rotten in Denmark  

Lofgren was CIA station chief in Denmark in 1979 when (“accidentally,” it is said, after drinking too much vodka at a Russian diplomatic event) he revealed to the KGB rezidentura the identity of a CIA asset. Consequently, the asset, Polish-born Boris Korczak, needed to be relocated to the USA for his own protection.

http://www.boriskorczak.com

But even though Korczak’s life was thereafter directly threatened by menacing KGB officers, Lofgren dragged his feet over getting him out quickly, telling the asset, “Hang in there.”

William Lofgren and Boris Korczak

Boris’s son, Robert Korczak, told me, “My dad had three CIA handlers, the last of which was Bill Lofgren. He was a liar and a cheat. Strange things started happening after his arrival. Lots of our family possessions were taken by him including four shopping bags filled with chunks of beautiful golden amber and assorted antiques from our house. Bill also demanded a large part of my dad’s Russian icon collection in exchange for 'expediting' our relocation to the USA.  Years later my dad explained to me that Bill was essentially shaking him down. Lofgren acted as though the Agency had sent him out to get rich off other people’s sweat. He was also reckless. My dad’s previous handlers were discreet in their dealings with him but Lofgren would pull up in our driveway. He was also a drinker, perhaps a functional alcoholic. It wouldn't shock me or my dad if he had been working for the Russians all along."

Fast forward from Copenhagen in 1979 to 2002, when Lofgren delivered to Clair George and me a report on Christopher and Richard Chandler, who were then residents of Monaco.

Now fast forward two additional decades, when it becomes abundantly clear that the “intelligence” provided by Lofgren about the Chandlers was false, i.e. disinformation fabricated by Russian intelligence officers who sought to defame the New Zealand-born brothers.

Was Lofgren duped by his spy-net?

Or was he a willing participant in a Russian intelligence disinformation scheme?

More important, given the grief Boris Korcazk suffered at Lofgren’s hands, an additional question begs to be asked:

Was William Lofgren recruited by the KGB in Copenhagen in 1979?

If the answer is yes, the damage done to the USA would have been more significant than Ed Howard, Aldrich Ames and Robert Hanssen all bundled together.

But it seems to me today’s CIA and FBI would prefer to sweep any such suspicion under a rug rather than investigate and potentially suffer embarrassment over what they might uncover.

For further (quite significant) context, here is my column from March 2023, published by the Santa Barbara News-Press.